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A Setback for
Environmental and
Other Public Interest Plaintiffs
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society,' the
United States Supreme Court struck a severe blow to public inter-
est litigation, particularly in the area of environmental law, by
eliminating the "private attorney general" exception to the Ameri-
can rule. Although the American rule required parties in judicial
proceedings to pay their own attorneys' fees, this exception had
arisen which permitted public interest claimants to be awarded
attorneys' fees. This article will discuss the holding in Alyeska and
will examine the legal precedents and policy considerations of the
private attorney general concept in order to demonstrate that the
Supreme Court should not have eliminated the private attorney
general exception to the American rule.
II. BACKGROUND
The Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and
Friends of the Earth brought suit in the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in 1970 to enjoin the issuance of right-of-way
permits by the Secretary of Interior for construction of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline.2 The district court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion because the issuance of such permits would violate both the
Mineral Leasing Act 3 and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 ("NEPA") .4 The State of Alaska and Alyeska intervened
in September, 1971, and in March, 1972, the Interior Department
1. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
2. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
3. 30 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
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released a new Environmental Impact Statement. 5 Subsequently,
the Secretary of Interior announced that the requested permits
would be granted. The district court then dissolved the prelimi-
nary injunction and dismissed the complaint.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the district court,7 on the basis of the Mineral Leasing
Act.8 Congress then effectively negated the court's decision by
amending the Mineral Leasing Act to allow the Interior Depart-
ment to grant permits to Alyeska.9 The amendment also declared
that the construction of the pipeline could proceed without any
further action under NEPA.10 The court of appeals was then
faced with the question of whether the plaintiffs should be awarded
attorneys' fees. It awarded the fees to them on the theory that
they had acted as private attorneys general and had "advanced and
protected in a very concrete manner substantial public interest."'1
In utilizing the private attorney general concept, the court was fol-
lowing a long line of federal cases, many in the environmental area,
which had recently been decided, using the private attorney general
rule.
12
Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court,' 3 and in a 5-2 decision,
with Justices Marshall and Brennan dissenting separately, it re-
versed the court of appeals. In an opinion by Mr. Justice White,
the Court held that the federal courts did not have the authority
to create a private attorney general exception to the American rule;
only Congress could do so.14
This opinion relied on the historical background of the American
rule15 which was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1796.16 This
rule required that each party to a judicial proceeding pay its own
attorneys' fees.' 7  However, because courts sometimes awarded
5. 421 U.S. at 244.
6. Id.
7. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
8. The court found that the NEPA issues were very complex and did not
need to be decided.
9. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153.
10. Id.
11. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. See 421 U.S. at 270 n.46.
13. 421 U.S. 240.
14. "[Ilt is apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys' fees
are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making
those awards are matters for Congress to determine." Id. at 262.
15. Id. at 251.
16. Acrambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
17. However, the Court adopted the American rule in very weak language.
Id.
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attorneys' fees anyway, in 1853 Congress passed a statute severely
limiting the amount of attorneys' fees which could be awarded to
the winning party.18 By referring to this historical information,
the Supreme Court in Alyeska appeared to hold that the American
rule was statutorily adopted in the 1853 legislation. As a result
of this interpretation of that legislation, the Court reasoned that
the federal courts have no power to create exceptions to the Ameri-
can rule. However, curiously, the Court did acknowledge the "bad
faith"'19 and the "common fund"20 exceptions to the American
rule, but stated that the private attorney general concept did not
fall under either of these exceptions.21 It also noted that it would
be very difficult for the courts to apply the private attorney general
concept since there would be no standards for them to utilize in
determining which statutes were significant enough to warrant use
of the exception 22 and permit an award to plaintiffs who brought
successful actions under these statutes.
A study of the legal precedents and policy considerations of the
private attorney general concept will show that the Supreme Court
erred in its interpretation of the concept.
III. LEGAL PRECEDENTS
In the 1796 case of Acrambel v. Wiseman,2 3 the Supreme Court
apparently adopted the American rule,24 although the language
18. 10 Stat. 161 (1853) provides:
That in lieu of the compensation now allowed by law to at-
torneys . . . the following and no other compensation shall
be taxed and allowed .. . In a trial before a jury, in civil
and criminal causes, or before referees, or on a final hearing
in equity or admiralty, a docket fee of twenty dollars ...
In cases at law, where judgment is rendered without a jury,
ten dollars, and five dollars where a cause is discontinued.
19. See p. 287 infra.
20. See p. 287-88 infra.
21. 421 U.S. at 259.
22. "But it would be difficult, indeed, for the courts without legislative
guidance to consider some statutes important and others unimportant
and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with the former." 421
U.S. at 263-64.
23. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
24. At the time of the American Revolution, both the common law and
equity courts in England awarded attorneys' fees to the winning party.
This practice became known as the English rule. The rule was not
adopted in the United States because the colonists distrusted lawyers.
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze in detail the arguments
for the English .rule or the American rule; however, the arguments in
favor of each will be briefly set out.
Proponents of the American rule argue that: (1) if attorneys' fees
were awarded to the winning party it would raise the stakes of litiga-
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used did not exhibit a strong commitment to it.25 Despite this
lack of strong affirmance, the American rule should be considered
to have been created originally by the judiciary, not the legislature.
The Supreme Court in Alyeska placed great weight on the Act
of 1853 in which Congress attempted to standardize the costs of
federal litigation,26 and also acknowledged that this legislation
was intended to stop the exorbitant awards with which the losing
parties were being unfairly saddledY It does not follow from
this latter conclusion, however, that the purpose of the 1853 legis-
lation was to forbid entirely the awarding of attorneys' fees to the
winning party, rather it should be inferred that the legislation was
intended to insure that these awards would be reasonable. Due
to the inflation of the past 120 years and the radical changes that
have occurred in modern litigation, the award limits in the 1853
statute are unreasonable today. When the purpose behind the 1853
legislation is considered, it appears that the Alyeska Court was
incorrect in holding that the 1853 Act was a statutory embodiment
of the American rule which is still binding today.
Regardless of its interpretation of the Act of 1853 and its sup-
posed limits on the Court's power, the Supreme Court in Alyeska
tion and scare some plaintiffs out of court and at the same time would
force some defendants to settle their claims unnecessarily; (2) eco-
nomic self-interest would force a party to avoid taking unnecessary
steps and incurring additional expenses; and (3) it avoids the prob-
lem of determining what a reasonable attorney's fee is.
The basic arguments for the English rule are that: (1) the higher
stakes involved in litigation increase the pressure for a settlement,
thereby relieving congestion in the courts; (2) the winning parties are
placed back in a position as good as before the dispute arose; (3)
plaintiffs will be less hesitant to bring a suit to vindicate their rights
since it will cost them nothing if they win; (4) plaintiffs will be less
likely to bring frivolous suits since they will be forced to pay the de-
fendant's attorneys' fees. Parenthetically it should be noted that the
United States is apparently the only western country to require each
party to bear his own attorneys' fees. See Nussbaum, Attorneys' Fees
in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301, 312 (1973).
25. The general practice in the United States is in opposition to
it [English rule]; and even if that practice [American rule]
were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the
respect of the court, until it is changed or modified by statute.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 306.
26. The statute as it now reads (28 U.S.C. § 1923) does not contain the
language of the 1853 Act which provided that "no other compensation
shall be taxed and allowed." This language was dropped in the 1948
Code Revision. However, the Court believed that there was no indi-
cation of a congressional intent to change the statute. See 421 U.S.
at 255 n.29.
27. Id. at 251.
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failed to acknowledge that under past decisions it had already
recognized the inherent equitable power of the federal courts to
fashion exceptions to the American rule where justice so demanded.
This failure is puzzling in that the Court did recognize that there
are two clear equitable exceptions to the American rule.28
The first exception is referred to as the "bad faith," or some-
times, the "obdurate behavior," exception.29 Under it, a success-
ful plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees when a defendant had
engaged in oppressive conduct, such as unreasonable delay. Usu-
ally the defendant's obdurate behavior must be of gross nature
before a federal court will apply the bad faith exception. The
reason for this provision is obvious-to punish the losing defendant
for his harrassing behavior and to reimburse the plaintiff for the
costs he incurred as a result of the defendant's unreasonable
actions.
The second recognized exception to the American rule is the
"common fund" exception. The first case to utilize it was Trustees
v. Greenough,30 in which a plaintiff successfully maintained an
action on behalf of a group of bondholders. Since all the bond-
holders benefited equally from the suit, but incurred no legal costs
whatsoever, the Court held that fairness dictated that the plaintiff
should be reimbursed from the fund he had protected. The effect
of reimbursing the plaintiff out of this common fund was that the
other bondholders each paid their proportional share of the attor-
neys' fees.
The "common fund" exception was further expanded in Sprague
v. Ticonic National Bank,3 1 a case in which the plaintiff had given
money in the form of a trust to the defendant bank which subse-
quently became insolvent. In an earlier proceeding, the plaintiff
28. Id. at 257.
29. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Universal Prod. Co. v.
Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1971); City
Bank of Honolulu v. Rivera Davila, 438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971); Un-
dersea Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 429 F.2d
543 (9th Cir. 1970); Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974, 984-88 (N.D. Miss.
1969).
This exception has been used in many school desegregation cases
where the court found that the defendant school board did not make
a good faith attempt to desegregate the school system. See Nesbit v.
Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1969); Rolfe v.
County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968); Bell v. School Bd.,
321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
30. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
31. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
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was held to be entitled to a lien on the trust funds given to the
bank.32 The plaintiff then sought reimbursement for attorneys'
fees because, by a combination of her action and the operation of
the principle of stare decisis, fourteen other trust claims had also
been established. Although the plaintiff did not purport to repre-
sent anyone else, the Supreme Court applied the "common fund"
exception, finding that "for all practical purposes [a fund was]
created for the benefit of others.1
3 3
A final step in the evolution of this exception occurred in Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 34 and Hall v. Cole, 35 when the Supreme
Court applied the "common fund" exception in situations where
there was no common fund, but rather a common benefit. In Mills,
the plaintiffs, minority shareholders in the defendant corporation,
brought a class action to set aside a corporate merger, alleging that
proxy statements issued by the defendant were materially mislead-
ing and violated section 14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Court found for the plaintiffs and awarded attorneys' fees to
them. The fact that there was no fund created from which the
fees could be paid was not important; instead the Court focused
on the presumption that the corporation and the other shareholders
benefited from the litigation. To allow them both to obtain the full
benefit of the plaintiffs' efforts, without contributing equally to the
litigation expenses, would be to enrich unjustly the others at the
plaintiffs' expense. It should be noted that the Court believed that
the corporation had received a substantial benefit from the plain-
tiffs' litigation in that it was forced to comply with federal law.36
Thus, in applying the common fund exception, it was not necessary
for a beneficiary of the litigation to have received a monetary bene-
fit. This point was illustrated further in Hall. There the plaintiff
brought suit under section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 195937 because he had been expelled from
a union for introducing a resolution at a union meeting which was
critical of the union officers. The district court held for the plain-
tiff and the issue on appeal was the propriety of awarding attor-
neys' fees. The Supreme Court granted the award theorizing that
the plaintiff had conferred a substantial benefit on the other mem-
bers of the union by protecting their right to free speech at union
meetings.3
32. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 14 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Me. 1936).
33. 307 U.S. at 161.
34. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
35. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
36. 396 U.S. at 396.
37. 29U.S.C. § 412 (1959).
38. 412 U.S. at 8.
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These cases all illustrate the Supreme Court's gradual expansion
of the common fund exception so as to increase the number of cases
where an award of attorneys' fees is proper. However, the Alyeska
decision departed from this steady trend.
In cases falling under one of the two acknowledged exceptions
to the American rule, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
awarding of attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs "is part of the
historic equity jurisdiction of the Federal courts." 39 In Hall, the
Court stated this in the following way:
Although the traditional American rule ordinarily disfavors the
allowance of attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory or
contractual authorization, federal courts, in the exercise of their
equitable powers, may award attorneys' fees when the interests
of justice so require. Indeed, the power to award such fees 'is
part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in
a particular situation,' and federal courts do not hesitate to exer-
cise this inherent equitable power whenever 'overriding consid-
erations indicate the need for such a recovery.'40
It is clear from these acknowledgments, therefore, that the
Supreme Court has not viewed the statute of 1853 as confiscating
the inherent equitable power of the federal courts to grant an
award of attorneys' fees in the appropriate situation.41
Apart from the American rule and its exceptions, the Supreme
Court has previously recognized the private attorney general con-
cept. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,42 the plaintiffs
39. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
40. 412 U.S. at 4-5.
41. The fact that other recent federal statutes have provisions for the
granting of attorneys' fees and NEPA and the Mineral Leasing Act do
not does not imply that Congress intended that under NEPA and the
Mineral Leasing Act a successful plaintiff should not receive an award
of attorneys' fees. In Hall and Mills, the Supreme Court rejected sim-
ilar and stronger arguments that where some sections of a statute con-
tained express provisions for the recovery of attorneys' fees, the ab-
sence of such provisions in other sections necessarily implied that fees
were not to be allowed under these latter sections. In Hall, the Court
said: "We cannot fairly infer from the language of that provision
[that did not provide nor prohibit attorneys' fees] an intent to deny
courts the traditional equitable power to grant counsel fees in appro-
priate situations." 412 U.S. at 10. Certainly, if the fact that a different
section of the same statute provided for an award of attorneys' fees
did not imply a congressional intent to deny attorneys' fees under sec-
tions that did not so provide, then the fact that Congress has provided
for the awarding of attorneys' fees in other statutes should not imply
that Congress intended to deny the fees under NEPA or the Mineral
Leasing Act.
42. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See also Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416
U.S. 696 (1974), where the plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees in
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brought a class action under the Civil Rights Act of 196443 to
enjoin racial discrimination at the defendant's restaurant. The
district court found for the defendant, but the court of appeals
reversed and remanded, directing the lower court to award attor-
neys' fees to the plaintiffs to the extent of the defendant's bad faith
in attempting to delay the litigation. On appeal, however, the Su-
preme Court held that attorneys' fees were to be awarded regardless
of the defendant's bad faith. It based its holding on a provision of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which provided for the
awarding of attorneys' fees.44  The Supreme Court incorporated
the concept of a private attorney general into the statutory scheme
to explain the congressional purpose in having a provision which
permitted the federal courts to award attorneys' fees at their discre-
tion.45 It held that a plaintiff who succeeds in obtaining an
injunction under Title II should ordinarily recover his attorneys'
fees unless there are special circumstances which negate such an
award. In explaining the rationale behind the private attorney
general concept, the Court said:
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot
recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not
alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful
plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees,
few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees
-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance argu-
ments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage
individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief
under Title H.46
Thus, although the Civil Rights Act had provided for the awarding
of attorneys' fees, it was the Supreme Court which first enunciated
the concept of a private attorney general.
As a result of the Piggie Park decision, lower federal courts
began applying the private attorney general rationale even when
there was no statutory authority for it. 47 One of the most fre-
their suit to force desegregation of the public school system; North-
cross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
44. Id. § 2000a-3 (b).
45. 390 U.S. at 402.
46. Id
47. See, e.g., Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974) (civil rights class
action against prison officials); Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd.,
495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974) (action brought by teachers to contest
school board's discriminatory employment policies); Taylor v. Perini,
503 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1974) (civil rights suit by prisoners alleging
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quently cited federal decisions using the concept was La Raza Unida
v. Volpe.48 There, the plaintiffs originally sought to enjoin the con-
struction of a state highway. When the injunction was granted,
49
they asked for attorneys' fees. In awarding them, the court em-
ployed the private attorney general concept and summarized the
criteria which other federal courts had used in applying this ration-
ale for awarding attorneys' fees. 50
1). The plaintiff must effectuate a strong congressional policy.
2). The plaintiff must benefit a large class of people.
3). There must be a necessity for private enforcement of the
policy, as opposed to governmental enforcement.
4). The financial burden of the litigation must outweigh any
potential benefit to an individual litigant.
The court in La Raza Unida applied the private attorney
general concept as an exception to the American rule. The concept
had originally been recognized in Piggie Park as existing within
a statutory framework. To fashion this new exception was simply
a logical extension of past Supreme Court decisions which had been
expanding the exceptions to the American rule, particularly the
common fund exception. However, in Alyeska, the Supreme Court
refused to follow precedent and would not allow the federal courts
discriminatory policies of prison officials); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder,
498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974) (suit to enjoin use of examination for fire-
men on the grounds that the examination was discriminatory); Brand-
enburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff chal-
lenged Hawaii's one year residency requirement for state welfare
benefits); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973) (black
brought suit to enjoin city zoning law which prohibited residential
construction in city limits); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir.
1972) (plaintiff brought suit alleging racial discrimination in leasing
of apartments); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir- 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973) (action by former chaplain of state
mental hospital for wrongful discharge which violated his right to free
speech); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (reapportion-
ment suit based on the exclusion of a class of college students from
voting).
48. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
49. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
50. Summarizing its test, the Court said:
The rule briefly stated is that whenever there is nothing in a
statutory scheme which might be interpreted as precluding it,
a private attorney general should be awarded attorneys' fees
when he has effectuated a strong congressional policy, which
has benefited a large class of people, and where further the
necessity and financial burden or private enforcement are
such as to make the award essential.
57 F.R.D. at 98.
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to exercise what the Court had previously acknowledged as their
"inherent equitable power."5' 1
15V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Just as Alyeska fails to follow the judicial precedents, so too
does it overlook prevailing policy considerations. Recently, the
under-representation of public interests in our legal system and the
desirability of increasing public interest representation in this sys-
tem have been noted. 52 The court in La Raza Unida pointed out
that "[r] esponsible representatives of the public should be encour-
aged to sue, particularly where governmental entities are involved
as defendants," 53 and an amicus brief noted that "only private citi-
zens can be expected to guard the guardians." 54
The most obvious reason for the under-representation of the
public interest in litigation is a financial one. 55 Generally, no one
individual has a sufficient enough interest in public interest litiga-
tion or legislation to induce him to expend substantial financial
resources in furthering that cause. On the other hand, private and
corporate interests are usually well protected both legally and
financially.5 6
The tide of public interest litigation has arisen significantly in
recent years,57 with much activity in the environmental area.
Because of the nature of their organizations, environmental groups
are often forced to rely on litigation rather than attempting to
further their goals through legislation.55 In following this course,
51. 412 U.S. at 5.
52. Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 305-11. The term "public interest" defies
precise definition. Nussbaum lists three characteristics of public inter-
est law suits:
1). The litigation involves issues of extreme importance.
2). The litigation will affect a substantial number of peo-
ple other than the plaintiff.
3). The litigation is brought by a private plaintiff.
Id. at 305-06.
53. 57 F.R.D. at 100-01.
54. Id. at 101.
55. Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 311.
56. Large law firms dealing mainly with corporate clients usually are able
to attract the more qualified law school graduates. Thus, while the
corporation gets the best legal assistance, the public interest is often
inadequately represented. See CouNTRYMAN & FINMAN, THE LAWYER
n MODERN SociETY 12 (1966).
57. Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 301.
58. The obvious reason for this preference for litigation is our tax system,
under which environmental groups will lose their status as charitable
organizations and their tax-exempt status if they engage in substan-
tial legislative lobbying. The loss of classification as a charitable or-
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they face a severe financial obstacle.59 Environmental lawsuits
are generally very complex.60 They often seek injunctive relief;
therefore, there is no monetary award to the plaintiffs from which
they can pay their attorneys' fees.61 Without the availability of
an award of attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs, litigation in the
environmental area, and to some extent in other public interest
areas, will be significantly inhibited.
The Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska is considered by some
as severely discouraging the environmental movement.6 2  Litiga-
tion in the area is necessary if environmental legislation, such as
NEPA, is to be enforced. But generally, United States district
attorneys have neither the expertise nor the desire to enforce
environmental legislation, 63 and on its face, NEPA does not provide
for sanctions for violators. 64 Therefore, it is left to citizen advo-
ganization would be very damaging to an environmental group be-
cause donations to the organization might dry up if donors could not
use their contributions as charitable deductions on their tax returns.
Similarly, the disadvantage of losing the tax exempt status is appar-
ent. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 170 (c) (2) [hereinafter cited as
CODE] which defines a charitable organization as "(B) organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or ed-
ucational purposes .. . (D) No substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation. .. ." CoDE § 501(c) provides that organizations are ex-
empt from federal income tax if they are "(3) . ..organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educa-
tional purposes .. . [n]o substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence leg-
islation."
59. Alyeska involved more than 4,000 hours of legal work. The estimated
award to be paid by Alyeska was over $100,000. See Witt, After
Alyeska: Can the Contender Survive?, JuaFs Docmoa, Oct., 1975, at 35.
60. King & Platter, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environ-
mental Litigation, 41 TEzx. L. REv. 27 (1973).
61. Id.
62. See 6 Exv. L.R. 133 (1975), in which two attorneys' opinions on this
subject are given. Dennis Flanney who represented the Wilderness So-
ciety in Alyeska said that the effect of the decision would not be great
because an award of attorneys' fees was not guaranteed under the pri-
vate attorney general exception, and if such an award were made, it
was only after the litigation. In his opinion, this is not a good way
to fund litigation.
However, Natalie Black, an attorney who has represented the Si-
erra Club at times, said that Alyeska will hamper environmental
groups because if they cannot recoup funds from one suit, they will
will be unable to finance litigation in other areas. As for public inter-
est litigation in general, there are some indications that the Alyeska
decision will be disastrous in that it will financially discourage public
interest plaintiffs. See Witt, supra note 59.
63. See 5 ENv. L.R. 10095 (1975).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
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cates to enforce congressional mandates in the environmental area
by seeking injunctions.65
Several underlying policy considerations influenced the Court
in Alyeska. First, the Court made reference to its fears about the
manageability of the private attorney general exception. 66  There
were two main concerns in this area. One was the prospect of fed-
eral courts being required to determine what statutes should be
considered important enough to warrant application of the private
attorney general concept. The Court felt this should be determined
by Congress, not by the courts. However, in expressing this fear
the Court ignored the crucial question which was whether the
successful plaintiffs had protected a substantial public interest.
The purpose of the private attorney general concept is to encourage
private citizens to litigate in the public interest; therefore, if the
plaintiff succeeds in protecting the public interest, his expenses
should be paid.
In determining what is in the public interest, the consideration
of congressional mandates would clearly be relevant, but it should
not be controlling. Other factors that should be considered are the
number of people potentially benefited by the litigation and the
actual benefit of the litigation. It should be noted that this require-
ment of protecting a substantial public interest is not the same as
asking whether the public was actually benefited, which is often
a volatile question. A court should not weigh the good results of
the litigation against its bad results and come up with a net result,
but rather it should determine whether the plaintiff was attempt-
ing to protect a substantial public interest, even though there were
some incidental detrimental effects which the plaintiff did not
intend. Such an application of the private attorney general concept
will best further the purpose of the concept which is to encourage
public interest litigation.
The distinction between protecting the public interest and
benefiting the public interest can be seen by analyzing typical
environmental suits. For example, if environmentalists enjoin the
65. Public interest suits have speeded court definition of what is
required of federal agencies under environmental protection
statutes. These suits have forced greater sensitivity in both
government and industry to environmental considerations.
Furthermore they have educated lawmakers and the public to
the need for new environmental legislation.
Comment, Liability for Attorneys Fees in the Federal Courts-The Pri-
vate Attorney General Exception, 16 B.C. Iiw. & Com. L. Rsv. 201
(1975), citing from U.S. Coutcn. ON ENVmo mENTAL QUALITY, EN-
vIRmvmNTAL QuALITY: 2D ANN. REP. 155-56 (1971),
66. 421 U.S, at 240,
ATTORNEYS' FEES
construction of a dam, they will clearly be protecting the public
interest if the construction would harm the environment. This does
not necessarily mean that the public interest will be benefited. The
determination of the actual benefit to the public interest would
require balancing the dam's advantages (preventing floods and
providing hydroelectric power) against its environmental disadvan-
tages (altering the ecological balance).
The Court in Alyeska failed to recognize the distinction between
asking whether the plaintiffs protected a substantial public interest
and whether the public was actually benefited. It only asked the
latter question; this resulted in concern over the possible damage
done to the public interest by delay in the construction of the
Alaska Pipeline at a time when there was an energy crisis. How-
ever, using the analysis set forth in this article, the plaintiffs in
Alyeska were deserving of an award of attorneys' fees because they
had protected a substantial public interest in the environment.
Besides deciding what statutes warrant application of the
private attorney general concept, there was a second manageability
problem. It concerned determining what was a reasonable attor-
neys' fee. However, this was not an insurmountable problem since
many federal statutes67 and private contracts specifically provided
for the awarding of attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff and,
therefore, the federal courts were already engaged in the deter-
muination of what was a reasonable attorneys' fee. In addition, since
the judge who determined the fee award was the same judge who
listened to the entire case, he was in excellent position to decide
what would be a reasonable award. As one federal court said: "A
trial court has firsthand knowledge of the proceedings before it and
it is thus clearly qualified to place a value on [the legal] services
without opinion evidence of an expert witness on the subject."6 8
67. For an extensive list'of federal statutes which specifically provide for
an award of attorneys' fees see 421 U.S. at 260 n.33.
68. Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 1150 (5th Cir. 1970). In
addition, the American Bar Association lists eight factors which should
be considered in determining what is a reasonable attorney's fee.
They are:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform
the legal service properly.
2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the accept-
ance of the particular employment will preclude other em-
ployment by the lawyer.
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the cir-
cumstances.
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In addition to its fears regarding the manageability of the
attorney general concept, the Court was also concerned about the
danger of swamping the federal courts with environmental litiga-
tion. Although this fear may be legitimate, it does not balance out
the strong need for public interest litigation in general, or environ-
mental litigation in particular. In addressing the issue of swamping
the courts, Chief Justice Burger had previously noted that, in the
past, fears that new proposals would have this effect were usually
not borne out.69 In addition, a Justice Department study has
shown that at the time the study was made less than one per cent
of the problem of overcrowding in the federal courts could be
attributed to environmental litigation.
7 0
Although the fears expressed in Alyeska have some basis, they
are not substantial enough to outweigh the benefits of the private
attorney general concept. The value of encouraging public interest
litigation is worth the potential problems resulting from the private
attorney general concept.
V. SOLUTION
A full evaluation of all the judicial precedents and the policy
considerations has shown that the elimination of the private attor-
ney general concept is not warranted. If the private attorney gen-
eral concept were to be accepted when it was not statutorily
prescribed, some concrete and pragmatic criteria should be estab-
lished to govern the administration of the concept. Justice Mar-
shall, in his dissent in Alyeska, listed three such criteria:
(1) the important right being protected is one actually or neces-
sarily shared by the general public or some class thereof; (2) the
plaintiffs pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any, would not
normally justify incurring the cost of counsel; and, (3) shifting
that cost to the defendant would effectively place it on a class
that benefits from the litigation.
71
These criteria differ in several respects from the four listed in
La Raza Unida.72  In comparing the two sets of criteria, where
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client.
7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the services.
ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONsiBILITY DR 2-OS(B) (1974).
69. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
70. See 3 ENV. L.R. 50015 (1973). Of course, this does not take into con-
sideration the fear that many additional public interest suits, other
than environmental suits, would be brought if the private attorney
general exception were adopted.
71. 421 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
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the La Raza Unida court required that the plaintiff effectuate a
strong congressional policy and benefit a large class of people, Jus-
tice Marshall merely required that the plaintiff protect an im-
portant right shared by the public. He would not require a
congressional mandate of that right. It is unclear precisely what
test Marshall envisioned, but he appeared to be looking to see if
the plaintiff actually benefited the public interest. This article has
already discussed the contention that the better test would be
whether the plaintiff protected a substantial public interest, not
whether there was a net benefit to the public.73
Marshall's second criterion, that the plaintiff's interest would
not justify the costs of litigation, was the same as the fourth
criterion listed in La Raza Unida, and it is essential to the private
attorney general rationale. Justice Marshall neglected one require-
ment for the application of the rationale, which the La Raza Unida
court mentioned and which appears to embody the very reason for
the private attorney general concept-that there be a definite need
for private enforcement in the area involved in the litigation. If
there is no need for private enforcement, then why encourage such
private actions through the awarding of attorneys' fees?
Finally, Justice Marshall's third criterion, that the cost be
shifted to the class that benefits from the litigation, was not neces-
sary. As noted by the majority in a footnote in Alyeska,
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Marshall was confusing the private attorney general exception with
the common fund exception in which the sole purpose of fee-shifting
is to place the burdens of litigation on those who actually benefit
from it. However, in the private attorney general concept, al-
though the litigation is for a worthy purpose, it is not the purpose
of the concept necessarily to place the costs of the litigation on
the beneficiaries of the litigation. Rather it is to encourage private
parties to litigate in the public interest. The court in La Raza
Unida noted that the costs and benefits of the litigation were some-
what matched but implied that this was only a factor to be consid-
ered and not an absolute requirement for the application of the
concept.75
Thus, in light of, the private attorney general concept's purpose,
namely, to encourage public interest suits, the criteria to be used
in determining when the concept is applicable should be: (1) the
successful plaintiff protected a substantial public interest; (2) there
was a definite need for private enforcement; and (3) the plaintiff's
73. See discussion on p. 294-95 supra.
74. 421 U.S. at 264 n.39.
75. 57 F.R.D. at 101.
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pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any, normally would not jus-
tify incurring the cost of counsel.76 By applying these three cri-
teria, the purpose of the private attorney general concept will be
effectuated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Alyeska decision struck a severe blow to the environmental
movement. The Supreme Court's decision is not supported by a
careful reading of the precedents. Policy arguments appear heav-
ily weighted in favor of the private attorney general exception to
the American rule. The three criteria which this article suggests
should be used in applying the exception would provide a practical
alternative to the harsh rule announced by the Court.
Robert L. Matthews '76
76. 421 U.S. at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
